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Any economic activity calls for the exercise of moral judgement. There are some economic 
activities that actively  promote collective benefit as a primary or secondary aim, and there are 
others that aim to increase the value of a firm. Investment decisions always have collective 
impact,  but  collective  returns  may  be  ignored  or  considered  less  important  in  company 
management if the objective is the maximisation of shareholder wealth. 
 
The allocative function exercised by banks in their credit activity may take this into account. 
Some banks nowadays focus on social profile, while others integrate the traditional approach 
with  this  new  sensibility.  But  unfortunately  banking  regulations  governing  stability  and 
soundness of the financial system make no mention of the social profile.  
 
The New Basel Capital Accord was an opportunity to recognise that bank's objectives may 
not consist only of the maximisation of shareholder wealth. But it was a missed opportunity, 
in that  it gave advantages to traditional commercial  banks and  not to banks  focussing on 
collective goals. This paper puts forward proposals for integrating the Basel II framework 
with profiles of collective bank credit policy. 
Social credit evaluation methods could help to identify those ethical banks which are more 
successful in meeting collective objectives. A sustainable credit appraisal methodology could 
have been examined by the Basel Committee and could have incentivated sustainable banking 
by giving it specific advantages. 
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Introduction 
The line of research into ethics and business and, in particular, ethics and finance, is very rich 
and diversified
1. It is the task of ethics to debate the ultimate purpose of human action, and 
therefore of economic activities. Depending on the aims of the economic activity, the rules of 
the  market  operators’  behaviour  vary.  If  we  modify  the  aim,  it  is  logical  to  expect  a 
modification in behaviour too. If the objectives of justice and equity are included among the 
economic agents’ aims, their behaviour is influenced by these objectives.  
 
The discussion about what should be the ultimate aims of economic activity is part of the 
debate in the equity and justice of the economic system. Economic actions and their results 
raise  problems  of  distribution  justice  and  behavioural  equity
2.  This  topic  is  particularly 
important for the financial intermediation system, as it is often felt that there is more danger 
of finance being estranged from ethics than for the world of business
3.  
 
On  one  hand,  applying  economic-financial  criteria  in  the  selection  of  projects  means 
favouring the allocation of resources to economically and financially self-supporting projects. 
This  selection  mechanism  guarantees  a  place  in  the  market  for  units  efficient  from  an 
economic and financial point of view and, at the same time, guarantees the survival of the 
financial system. 
 
On  the  other  hand,  the  fact  that  investment  analysis  can  also  consider  social  and 
environmental profiles should surprise only the most superficial observers. Any economic 
activity calls for the exercise of moral judgement and there are some economic initiatives that 
actively promote a collective benefit as a primary or secondary aim.  
 
We argue that the analysis of company decisions taken for profit motives can be strengthened 
by  a  logic  that  also  pays  attention  to  social  and  environmental  profiles.  Assessing  and 
approving an investment means applying the right amount and quality of sensitivity in order 
to describe the decision-making framework. In some cases, this framework considers non-
                                                 
1 See, among others, Bianchi (1996); Boatright (1999); Caloia (1997); Cesarini (2003); Fondazione Giordano 
dell'Amore (1997); Perrini (2002); Sen (1987); Sen (1991); Sen, Williams (1982). 
2 See, among others, Arnsperger, Van Parijs (2000). 
3 Tettamanzi in Cesarini, Tettamanzi, Vigorelli (2003). Social and alternative banking: project selection and monitoring after the New Basel Capital Accord 
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financial variables. 
 
The allocation process of banks in their lending functions can also consider the non financial 
variables. Some banks have innovatively placed the social and environmental profiles in the 
centre of their activity
4; others integrate this new sensitivity into a traditional approach
5. The 
new regulations concerning minimum capital requirements (hereinafter referred to as the “B2 
framework”) pay no specific attention to this profile, and this is a shortcoming. Our paper 
makes proposals  for  integrating the B2  framework by  including  collective profiles of the 
banks’ credit policies. 
 
The  paper  is  organised  as  fallows:  section  1  offers  an  overview  of  the  banks  that  set 
themselves collective objectives. Section 2 proposes a model to describe the project selection 
process  according  to  final  objectives:  profit  objectives  and  collective  objectives.  The 
framework  highlights  how  hybrid  cases  play  a  primary  role:  there  are  a  number  of 
circumstances in which it is not clear whether the typical logical framework to be applied is 
that of profit investments or collective investments. There is also a surprisingly large number 
of cases in which it is useful to proceed with a more or less accentuated integration of the 
logics of analysis. Section 3 looks at the extent to which the new regulation on minimum 
banking  capital  considers  these  aspects,  and  suggests  some  areas  for  improvement  in  the 
regulation of social and sustainable banking. 
 
                                                 
4 In Europe, examples are the banks  federated in FEBEA (Fédération Européenne des Banques Etiques et 
Alternatives), European Federation of Ethical and Alternative Banks. FEBEA members are financial institutions 
whose aim is to finance social and solidarity-based economy. According to the Charter, the aim of the banks 
must not amount to seeking profit alone; the economic initiatives financed must follow goals of job creation (in 
particular social employment), sustainable development, ethical and cultural diversity, international solidarity, 
and fair trade. The federated banks are: Banca Popolare Etica (Italy), Bank für Sozialwirtschaft (Germany), BBK 
Solidarioa Fundazioa (Spain), Caisse Solidaire du Nord Pas-de-Calais (France), Caixa Pollença (Spain), Cassa 
Centrale Casse Rurali Trentine (Italy), Charity Bank (United Kingdom), Crédal (Belgium), Crédit Coopératif  
(France), Cultura Sparebank (Norway),  Ekobanken (Sweden), Femu Qui (France), Fiare Fundazioa (Spain), 
Hefboom (Belgium), IGF (Switzerland), Merkur (Denmark), La NEF (France), SIDI (France), Tise (Poland), 
Fundació Un Sol Món (Spain), Vernus (Slovak Republic). (http://www.febea.org/index.html) 
5 For an exploration into the field of environmental and social dimension of sustainability in the banking sector, 
see Jeucken (2004). The research is focussed mainly on the environmental dimension of sustainability. Alberto Lanzavecchia – Lucia Poletti 
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1. Social and alternative banking 
The expressions ethical banking, social banking, sustainable finance and alternative banking 
refer to forms of financial intermediation aimed at evaluating the collective aims of projects, 
and the implications of these projects for the stakeholders, in the widest sense of the term. 
There are some differences between them, but what they all share is attention to the socio-
environmental aims and impact of the projects financed. They are instruments that do not 
consider the financial profile as the most important objective. 
 
The  concept  of  ‘social  and  alternative  banking’  is  closely  linked  to  the  development  of 
microfinancial activities. The term microfinance is general, and it means “the promotion and 
diffusion of forms of financial intermediation in favour of marginal market segments, which 
are difficult to serve effectively through traditional channels and methods of contact with the 
customers, due to their size, income structure, or due to lack of information”
6. It includes a 
wide range of  financial  services (current accounts, savings products, credit and  insurance 
activities) and targets segments of customers whose needs are not satisfied by the traditional 
financial  intermediation activity. These customers are generally  socially  and economically 
weaker  subjects,  who  are  thus  excluded  from  traditional  intermediation  circuits.  This 
exclusion may be total, if the subjects in question have no contact with the financial system, 
or  may  be  limited  to  certain  products  or  services,  such  as  access  to  credit
7.  Among 




The supply of products and services that respond to the specific needs of marginal segments 
of customers is therefore an economic activity that also has a social function, to the extent that 
it breaks down barriers to the financial system. The causes of financial exclusion may be 
removed  through  the  specific  reorientation  of  financial  services
9.  For  example,  they  may 
avoid applying conditions that  make  financial products unsuited to the needs of  marginal 
customers, or they may avoid mechanisms that restrict access following an unfavourable risks 
analysis. The so-called “alternative finance”, and more specifically the “alternative banks”, 
                                                 
6 Viganò in Viganò (2004). 
7 See Anderloni in Anderloni (2003) and Financial Services Authority (2000).  
8 The definition of microcredit adopted in the 1997 Microcredit Summit is: “programmes extend small loans to 
very poor people for self-employment projects that generate income, allowing them to care for themselves and 
their families”.  
9 About the causes of financial exclusion see Financial Services Authority (2000). Social and alternative banking: project selection and monitoring after the New Basel Capital Accord 
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find their own niche in this area. This reorientation does not necessarily take place within 
informal finance channels, as happens especially in developing countries, but it may also take 
place within formal intermediation channels. Thus a space in the market exists for financial 
banking intermediaries to create products and services suited to marginal customers, while 
respecting economic and financial health of the intermediary
10. 
 
                                                 
10 This emerged during the conference Investing in Microfinance, The Role of Banks, held in Milan, Palazzo 
Mezzanotte, 18 November 2004. See also Harper and Singh Arora (2005). Alberto Lanzavecchia – Lucia Poletti 
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2. Investment evaluation criteria: the technical-financial profile and the 
socio-environmental profile 
The typical problem faced by businessmen in private companies or operators in organisations 
with collective purposes is assessing the use of cash for activities and initiatives with a return 
in  financial,  social  and  environmental  terms.  For  this  reason,  both  operators  require 
methodologies  and  criteria  to  measure  the  profitability  of  the  investment:  ex  ante,  for 
selection and acceptance and ex post, to satisfy the reporting requirements imposed by the 
stakeholders on the use made of financial resources. 
 
There  are  two  possible  approaches  to  assessment:  objectives  of  collective  interest,  and 
objectives of private profit. The collective interest approach has historically been the almost 
exclusive  prerogative  of  public  intervention,  for  which  investment  decision-making 
procedures  have  been  oriented  to  assessing  effects  on  the  community.  The  private  profit 
approach  is  typical  of  investment  decisions  made  by  private  companies,  banks  and  other 
financial intermediaries, traditionally based on strict parameters of profit making. 
 
It is also true that the attention of companies towards the social and environmental effects of 
their  actions  is  growing,  as  is  shown  by  numerous  initiatives  based  on  Corporate  Social 
Responsibility. A certain shift in this direction has been encouraged by the financial markets, 
which are becoming increasingly attentive to the behaviour and characteristics of the issuers. 
The rapid growth of ethical funds and the increasing attention to pension funds bear witness 




As they are responsible for channelling the savings deposited by surplus subjects among the 
various deficit subjects, financial intermediaries have the opportunity to select subjects and 
projects for financing. In this sense, they can influence company behaviour by subordinating 
the  allocation  of  financial  resources  to  the  existence  of  precise  economic  and  socio-
environmental requirements. 
 
The monitoring carried out by the financial intermediaries on companies traditionally consists 
                                                 
11 According to Avanzi SRI Research and SiRi Company (2004), in Europe the number of socially responsible 
funds grew from 280 in 2000-2001 to 354 in June 2004 (+26%).  The total amount of assets under management 
grew from 14.482 billion euros at the end of 2001 to 19.034 billion euros at the end of June 2004 (+31%). Social and alternative banking: project selection and monitoring after the New Basel Capital Accord 
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of  monitoring  return  on  investments  and  the  solidity  of  the  companies  financed.  Where 
collective  demands  emphasize  other  issues,  the  monitoring  of  the  collective  performance 
becomes important, as it is linked to the most important stakeholder objectives. This profile is 
not currently very important, but these issues are becoming progressively more like this. 
 
For projects, the main traditional selection criteria widely accepted by practitioners can be 
traced back to DCF (Discounted Cash Flow) methodology, which measures the value of an 
investment on the basis of the current value of future incremental cash flows. However, for 
“wider” assessments, the models based on cash flow alone must be integrated or supported by 
other types of evaluation. 
 
Is financial return an objective or a constraint? 
The implementation of a project, understood in its widest sense, always requires the use of 
financial resources, channelled through the financial system (Figure 1). 
 




Yunus suggests that the return from activities in which resources are invested comprises two 
components: economic/financial return and social return. Some entrepreneurs may be driven 
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activity as long as it is financially viable
12. Doubt has been cast, in fact, on the simple diagram 
where the for-profit / financial objective / social constraints sector is counterposed to the non-
profit / financial constraint / social objective sector. 
 
Identifying where financial return is an objective and where it is a constraint may appear a 
simple problem. But this is not the case. In the traditional scheme, saleable goods and services 
are products designed to make a profit and belong to the profit field. Goods and services that 
are not saleable, when worthy of any attention at all, are offered through an altruistic logic, 
that of non-profit. The non-profit sector sees the financial profile as a constraint in reaching 
its  own  objective.  The  for-profit  sector  sees  the  financial  profile  as  an  objective  to  be 
achieved. The set of cases in which financial return is an objective and the set of cases in 
which financial return is a constraint are not strictly separate. Microcredit is an example of 
activity run either by for-profit or non-profit organizations, with the main aim of achieving 
social goals. 
 
Investment policies and financial intermediaries 
On the basis of the somewhat brief considerations made up to this point, we distinguish cases 
of  financial  behaviour  where  the  profit  objectives  and  the  non-economic  objectives  vary 
between a range of possible extremes. Table 1 illustrates this distinction in behaviour, which 
can be operated by financial intermediaries in their role as project financers. The squares are 
shaded according to the importance to the financer of profit or social-environmental impact. 
 
Policies  A,  B  and  C  consist  of  financial  operations  with  capital  repayment  on  maturity, 
against which payment of  an appropriate recompense of the risk  is  foreseen. The project 
financed may be profit-oriented, or non-profit oriented, but in any case it is financed against 
the obligation to repay the capital. Policy D, defined  in the table as  “grants”, consists of 
financing projects without any obligation to repay the capital. To all extents and purposes, 
therefore, it is a donation 
                                                 
12 See Yunus (1998). Social and alternative banking: project selection and monitoring after the New Basel Capital Accord 
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Table 1 
 
      Aims of the investor 
    Policy  Profit  Social-environmental 
impact 
A  Financing for profit projects     
B  Financing for profit projects with 
social-environmental evaluations 
   
Capital repayment 
area 
C  Financing non-profit projects     
  D  Grants      
Objective         
Constraint         
 
The  objectives  of  the  financial  intermediary  influence  the  nature of  the  projects  financed 
(profit or non-profit) and the nature of the analyses carried out during project selection. The 
existence of operators interested in taking action on all four levels clearly affects the space for 
those  who  decide  on  fund  allocation  (banks  and  foundations  or  charities).  Various 
possibilities are therefore defined to implement projects that are oriented to varying degrees of 
both private return and/or collective return. 
 
Differences between the various models of financial support can be seen in Table 2. The 
natural area of intervention of commercial banks is model A in Table 2. But over the past few 
years, in step with the increasing foothold of CSR, banks have begun to pay attention to the 
effects of the financed projects on the community, and have introduced assessment of social 




                                                 
13 See Jeucken (2004). Alberto Lanzavecchia – Lucia Poletti 
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Table 2 
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Traditional banks also finance non-profit projects and organisations, somewhat marginally or 
as  a  secondary  business  area,  in  which  in  any  case  they  evaluate  solvency.  Generally, 
traditional  banks  tend  not  to  enter  into  the  socio-environmental  impact  of  the  projects, 
following the classical credit analysis prior to granting loans. They rarely offer differentiated 
analyses that bear in mind the specific elements of the sector. 
 
Financing policies for profit projects that pay attention to social and environmental issues are, 
on the other hand, becoming more and more common in mutual funds. In selecting the shares 
in the portfolio, “ethical” or “socially responsible” funds adopt criteria with varying degrees 
of selectivity. This sector is now universally known as SRI (Social Responsible Investment). 
Negative screening is the most simple selection criterion, involving the exclusion from the 
portfolio of shares in companies that manufacture products that are harmful to dignity, to 
fundamental rights, human health and/or in companies that work in the weapons industry. 
Alongside negative screening we may often see positive screening. Among those companies Social and alternative banking: project selection and monitoring after the New Basel Capital Accord 
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passing the negative screening, the ones who are best positioned in terms of parameters based 
on the  analysis  of  corporate  social  responsibility  are  selected.  For  positive  screening,  the 
following  are  examples  of  the  elements  assessed:  internal  social  policy  (e.g.:  working 
conditions), environmental policies (e.g.: waste treatment and emissions), relations with the 
institutions and the  local community. The CSR elements are usually  assessed by external 
bodies,  that  are  to  all  extents  ethical  rating  agencies.  In  any  case,  socio-environmental 
screening goes hand in hand with the financial assessment, which concerns the progress of the 
shares in the market. 
 
Investment evaluation criteria and logic: solvency or credit worthiness? 
The different nature of financed projects affects the choice of criteria and the assessment logic 
used for investments. For A or B type financing as shown in Table 2, solvency, understood in 
the traditional sense as the capacity to face up to contractual obligations in a precise and 
punctual manner, plays a central role. It is the analysis of the solvency of profit projects that is 
sometimes integrated with socio-environmental assessments.  
 
For financing non-profit projects, the concept of solvency has a different connotation. In fact, 
solvency can be understood not only on the basis of economic-financial elements, but also 
with reference to the characteristics of the organisation and the methods used in relation to the 
outside world. The assessment of solvency can be based, therefore, on the economic situation 
and assets of the subject requesting financing as well as on direct knowledge of the subject (or 
organisation) or the reasons for project implementation. Widening the analysis may lead to 
the consideration of “bankability” for subjects that would not otherwise be deemed like this if 
evaluated  on  traditional  solvency  criteria  alone.  Also  in  microcredit  the  assessment  of 
solvency is not based on any collateral, but on the flows from the projects and on trust
14. 
 
The investment selection criteria mirror the choices of the intermediary on the type of activity 
they  intend  to  finance  and  on  the  requirements  of  the  activity  being  financed.  So  the 
intermediary is the filter through which financial resources are allocated. 
 
The use of both economic-financial criteria and socio-environmental ones is translated into a 
two-fold result in terms of allocation: the destination of resources towards projects with better 
                                                 
14 See Yunus (2003). Alberto Lanzavecchia – Lucia Poletti 
- 12 - 
social-environmental impact, and, among these, the destination of resources towards more 
efficient projects. 
 
This approach is very different from the traditional approach to investment selection. The 
traditional approach sees, on the one hand, the problem of choosing profit investments, to 
which a specific class of decision-making criteria is applied. On the other hand, it sees social 
and collective initiatives that are not oriented to profits, and therefore elude financial criteria. 
These  initiatives  are  evaluated  using  completely  different  criteria.  These  differences  in 
approach also have repercussions for operators dealing with the two types of assessment. 
 
The traditional approach is too simple. We should by now be able to accept that there is a 
continuous spectrum of possibilities, from the exclusively profit-oriented initiative to those 
that are most radically non-profit
15. In the in-between cases, which are the interesting ones, an 
assessment strategy has to be developed to combine the two profiles. 
 
The integration of financial and collective criteria presents a number of precise applicational 
and logical problems: 
 
-  First of all, we need to verify whether a sufficiently shared system of values exists that 
can be used as a basis for the collective evaluation of investments; 
-  Secondly,  we  need  to  identify  the  most  appropriate  method  of  integration  for 
collective and financial criteria. 
 
Regarding  the  second  point,  it  is  useful  to  highlight  that  it  is  possible  to  identify  the 
social/environmental  merit  of  the  project  either  as  a  binary  variable,  or  as  a  continuous 
variable. According to the first point of view, collective merit either exists or does not exist; 
some projects are acceptable, others are not. If such cases were presented in real life, the 
problem of the coexistence between financial and collective criteria would be very simple. It 
would be sufficient for the initiative to pass the social/environmental test in order to then 
apply the financial criterion. 
 
In reality, the ethical problem of the social and environmental consequences is much more 
                                                 
15 See Yunus (1998). Social and alternative banking: project selection and monitoring after the New Basel Capital Accord 
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complex. Only in the clearest of cases it is social merit at one end of the spectrum, and it is 
therefore of little concrete importance. We need evaluation logics for the intermediate cases, 
as the ethicality of behaviour is a continuous variable. It can have extremely low levels (such 
as the production of weapons of mass destruction or drugs), extremely high values (such as 
the production of medicines to fight rare diseases), but also levels that are much more difficult 
to determine. 
 
The approach used by some practitioners highlights the need for the coexistence of the ethical 
parameter with the financial
16. These operators manage an evaluation grid using two axes 
(Figure  2):  the  horizontal  axis  represents  financial  merit,  meaning  the  effect  on  the 
shareholders, which can go from very high to negative, with the loss of the entire invested 
capital; the vertical axis represents the social/environmental merit, meaning the profile of the 
effects  on  the  community;  this  can  also  be  very  high,  but  also  limited,  but  always  in  a 
continuous but difficult evaluation. 
It  is  clear  that  the  combined  social/environmental  and  financial  selection  criteria  should 
exclude projects that do not satisfy both parameters.  
 
The optimal working space is in the top right hand quadrant (quadrant I), which is satisfactory 
from all points of view. Projects that can be placed in quadrant I have good indicators both in 
socio-environmental  terms  and  in  economic-financial  terms,  and  therefore  do  not  present 
particular difficulties for the operator in charge of deciding on the financing. 
 
The top left hand quadrant (quadrant II) corresponds to projects that do not have an economic 
return but which are very important for the community. Non-profit organisations tend to be in 
this quadrant. This does not necessarily mean that these bodies should obtain financing simply 
because they provide services for the public good
17.  
 
The bottom right hand quadrant (quadrant IV) should be excluded on regulatory grounds as 
well as through the ethical assessment. 
Quadrant III should not be interesting for any operators, as it corresponds to activities that are 
not only harmful from a social and environmental point of view, but also produce negative 
                                                 
16 See Bicciato (2000). 
17 It should also be remembered that the fact of being a non-profit body does not necessarily imply carrying out 
activities effectively useful for the community. Alberto Lanzavecchia – Lucia Poletti 
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economic-financial results. 
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Source: Bicciato F. (2000). 
 
The above situation underlines how the allocative function of the financial system must be 
judged from both an economic profile in its true sense and from a collective point of view. 
The  social  function  of  credit  is  a  subject  that  is  traditionally  studied  in  financial 
intermediation economics, and there are areas of resource allocation for social purposes that 
are  not  traditionally  managed  by  bank  operators.  The  most  significant  experiences 
demonstrate  that  attention  to  the  effects  on  the  community  reduces  the  incidence  of 
insolvency in the loan portfolio
18. 
 
Integration towards socio-environmental criteria 
There is attention to socio-environmental aspects not only by those who believe that they can 
lead to improvement in economic and financial performance
19, but also by those who attribute 
an independent value to “responsible” behaviour of economic operators, whether these are 
companies or financial intermediaries. It is repeatedly stressed that economic operators should 
adopt ethically correct behaviour independently of the economic return that derives from that 
                                                 
18 See the case of Grameen Bank. 
19 See Berman, Wicks, Kotha, Jones (1999). Social and alternative banking: project selection and monitoring after the New Basel Capital Accord 




The  different  methods  used  by  the  economic  operators  to  demonstrate  their  orientation 
towards social and environmental aspects comprise initiatives to integrate economic-financial 
and socio-environmental aspects.  
 
Tools for integration are usually affected by so-called  “stakeholders view”. In the case of 
businesses and banks, this vision is shown externally basically through social/environmental 
reporting and the other CSR tools or measures of stakeholders protection. In the specific case 
of the banks, however, special mechanisms could be set up to further integrate the borrower 
assessment process in addition to the traditional economic and financial analyses. 
It  is  not  possible  to  identify  a  sole  theoretical  structure  integrating  the  two  approaches. 
Nevertheless,  not  exclusively  financial  criteria  are  included  in  lending  processes  in  the 
following cases: 
-  verification  of  the  respect  of  environmental  regulations
21  to  stop  any  possible 
sanctions or legal action from reducing the value of the portfolio. Banks see the value 
of their assets threatened above all by the risk of the financed subject being sanctioned 
by its non-compliance with these regulations. They may therefore wish to carry out 
screening for this purpose, especially to verify whether a cost risk exists that could 
compromise the financed subject’s ability to repay the debt. This is the case above all 
for environmental issues, which are governed by precise regulations. 
-  The signature of voluntary agreements, for example the Equator Principles of project 
financing, which require the assessment of the social and environmental effects of the 
project. 
-  Social and alternative banking, with primarily social objectives, which therefore carry 
out double screening; economic-financial to verify the solidity of the initiative and 
socio-environmental to verify that the activity carried out promotes or at least does not 
hamper the achievement of the socio-environmental aims. 
 
                                                 
20 See Shiva (2002). 
21 This aspect has become more important above all following the issue of the European Directive 2004/35/EC of 
21
st April 2004 on environmental liability concerning pollution prevention and control, which establishes that 
“the prevention and control of environmental pollution should be implemented by applying the “who pollutes 
pays” principle”. When assessing loans, banks therefore should verify the environmental measures taken by a 
company, above all concerning the fact that environmental investments generally have a rather long return cycle. Alberto Lanzavecchia – Lucia Poletti 
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Finally,  it  should  be  remembered  that  institutional  investors  (such  as  ethical  or  socially 
responsible  funds)  carry  out  a  two-fold  assessment  of  the  borrowers,  both  socio-
environmental and economic-financial. This directly places the investor in the condition of 
carrying out a broad-based selection of the activities to invest in. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                   
This kind of analysis has been implemented by the so-called “green banks”, which include conditions concerning 
environmental investments in their contracts and include these variables in the credit assessment process. Social and alternative banking: project selection and monitoring after the New Basel Capital Accord 
- 17 - 




The Basel Accord and investor protection  
There are basically two objectives of banking supervision stated in the revised framework of 
the “International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards”, better know 
as  the  “New  Capital  Accord”  or  “Basel  II”,  issued  by  the  Basel  Committee  on  Banking 
Supervision
22 in June 2004 (hereinafter referred to as the “New Accord”):
23 
1)  to strengthen the soundness and stability of the international banking system through 
the introduction of minimum capital requirements; 
2)  to reduce the competitive differences between banks operating internationally through 
the introduction of minimum common rules
24. 
 
Both objectives should also achieve a reduction of the probability of banking crises, thus a 
higher  protection  for  investors,  without  compromising  international  competition  in  the 
banking sector. 
 
To this end, the Basel Committee defines the minimum capital requirements for financial 
institutions through three steps: 
a)  the  definition  of  regulatory  capital,  directly  from  accounting  figures,  destined  to 
“protect” the bank from unexpected losses;
25 
b)  the assessment of the overall level of the bank activity risks, measured by the Risk 
Weighted Assets (RWA), through the measurement of the three main sources of risks 
– credit, market and operating.  
c)  the establishment of a minimum ratio, of at least 8%, between the regulatory capital 
                                                 
22 The Basel Committee was established as the Committee on Banking Regulations and Supervisory Practices by 
the  central  bank  Governors  of  the  Group  of  Ten  countries  at  the  end  of  1974  in  the  aftermath  of  serious 
disturbances in international currency and banking markets. Countries are represented by their central bank and 
also by the authority with formal responsibility for the prudential supervision of banking business where this is 
not the central bank. 
23 Cf. paragraph 4 of the New Accord. Objectives that had already been explored in the title of the document: 
International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards. A revised framework, BIS, June 
2004 
24 See Wagster (1996). 
25 For an analysis of the role of capital in financial institutions see: Berger, Herring and Szego (1995), Koch and 
Macdonald (2003), Santos (2001). Alberto Lanzavecchia – Lucia Poletti 




Indeed, the strengthening of the soundness and stability of the banking system is also a social 
objective, as it aims to provide a greater protection to investors and small depositors. In fact, 
banks  manage  information,  in  brokerage  activities,  and  mostly  risks,  in  qualitative  asset 
transformation activities, to gain an economic return
27. The minimum economic capital
28 held 
by a bank provides a cushion to absorb losses and to remain solvent, by assuring that the 
value  of  the  assets  (e.g.  investments)  will  never  reach  the  value  of  the  liabilities  (e.g. 
depositor's and other creditors money). Bank capital also provides access to funds against 
liquidity problems
29 and it constrains growth and shareholder’s returns
30. 
 
The protection guaranteed by the banking regulation aims to protect the money entrusted to 
the banks by depositors and investors. Denying this ethical and social aim, accusing the New 
Accord of being a source of capital rationing or of any other damaging effects on borrowers, 
is a malicious and a poor interpretation of the facts. 
 
The New Accord makes no proposals or provision on pricing and investment decisions. These 
                                                 
26  Much  banking  literature  (for  example,  Kahane  1977 and  Di  Cagno  1990)  suggests  that  constraining  the 
portfolio 
composition  of  an intermediary  or  specifying  a  minimum  capital requirement  by  itself  cannot  generally  be 
regarded as an effective way of limiting the probability of ruin for a firm. However, a combination of these 
regulatory instruments may achieve the desired result. Lackman (1986) and Kim and Santomero (1988) show 
that different commonly used capital adequacy constraints have different effects on bank portfolios. 
27 See Bhattacharya and Thakor (1993). Borrowing-lending activity transforms maturity, divisibility, liquidity 
and credit risk of funds raised and capital employed. That’s why it is often referred to an “qualitative asset and 
liability transformation”.    
28 More formally speaking, banks should hold equity capital whose market value should be able to offset future, 
unidentified and unexpected losses (e.g. the value-at-risk of  banking activities). Since the market value of equity 
has to be assessed, but a unique valuation method cannot be applied throughout different countries and banks, 
the Basel Accord has set up a proxy solution: the market value of equity is substituted by a “modified” book 
value of bank capital. According to Matten (2002, p.32), “these rules are necessarily crude, as they have to be 
applied to banks across a wide range of businesses, legal systems and accounting practices”. This is consistent 
with the weaknesses of the new and the former Basel capital accord shown, among the others, by Koch and 
Macdonald (2003, p.484), and Sironi (2005). Not surprisingly, the Basel Committee is aware that interactions 
between regulatory and accounting approaches can have significant consequences on capital adequacy (par. 12, 
New Accord). 
29  Pringle  (1974)  argues  that  in  addition  to  the  traditional  function  of  risk-bearing,  capital  is  important  in 
adjusting  the  maturity  structure  of  liabilities.  Pringle’s  main  conclusion  is  that  market-determined  capital 
structures are preferable to those imposed by regulators and supervisors. However, Taggart and Greenbaum 
(1978) believe that the market-determined capital positions may vary widely according to the regulatory setting. 
According to Alexander, (1990) because of the lack of uniformity in bank accounting and disclosure, it is not 
possible to compare the performance of banks across European borders. Since regulatory capital is influenced by 
accounting standards, it has been argued by Buser, Chen and Kane (1981), that “asset side” minimum regulatory 
requirements, such as the “Federal Deposit Insurance”, would be preferable. 
30 For an analysis of the effects of the capital structure on the cost of capital, see Davis and Lee (1997), Wall and 
Peterson (1998) and Sironi (2001). Social and alternative banking: project selection and monitoring after the New Basel Capital Accord 
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are decided and implemented according to the objectives of each bank. While it cannot be 
denied that bank capital is a scarce resource, and therefore has to be optimised, it is also true 
that such optimisation must take place on the basis of a specific utility function. 
From what has been stated above, it should be clear that the financial objective – to “create 
value” –  is only sometimes the final objective of a firm, but at other times it is a constraint to 
the achievement of collective objectives. 
 
The New Accord and freedom of choice in pricing policies 
Equity  capital  is  expensive  since  shareholders  demand  appropriate  returns  from  risky 
investments.  As  a  consequence,  managers,  in  particular  those  of  banks  listed  in  a  stock 
market, act defining and carrying out policies and decisions designed to increase the market 
value  of  the  firm.  The  pricing  policy  in  banks  whose  objective  is  the  maximisation  of 
shareholder wealth (e.g. “value creation”) is very simple and clear. These banks might tend to 
transfer the marginal cost of the scarce resource – the equity capital – to another stakeholder: 
the customer. As the minimum capital requirement is a constraint to growth and profitability, 
the marginal cost that would otherwise be borne by the banks must be necessarily transferred 
downstream to corporate customers. 
 
The transfer and the transformation of an explicit cost (e.g. the expected return of the bank 
shareholders) into a hidden cost, from a bank to its corporate customers, is carried out in two 
ways: 
1.  By asking the corporate customers to increase their own equity capital, offering in 
exchange the same spread for lending. This strategy allows the bank to absorb less of 
its regulatory capital (thus avoiding future increases in capital), by reducing the credit 
risk of the counterpart. The  marginal  cost of capital of the  bank (explicit)  is paid 
(implicitly) by the corporate customers through its own recapitalisation. 
2.  By increasing the cost of the financing (e.g. the “credit spread”) to those companies 
that do not want to increase their capital, in an amount equal to the marginal cost of 
the regulatory capital  absorbed. 
 
Any commercial pricing strategy and banking operation policy is independent of the New 
Accord, which defines only the standards for international competition and minimum capital 
requirements.  The  pricing  of  the  activities  is  left  to  the  discretion  of  bank  management, 
according to bank objectives. Alberto Lanzavecchia – Lucia Poletti 
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Pricing considers the weighted average cost of the bank capital,
31 in which the cost of equity 
capital is only estimated and depends on the utility function of shareholders. In fact, in pricing 
their activities, banks with financial objectives will also include shareholders’ expected return. 
Banks with collective objectives, but necessarily with financial and solvency constraints, will 
include all the monetary costs of funds and of their operating structure, but their shareholders 
expected return might not only be transferred downstream in the pricing, but might not even 
be a financial or market cost. 
 
Social banks, or those with collective aims, are therefore freer than “traditional” banks to 
choose their own commercial policies, within the constraint of the New Accord. 
 
The New Accord and customer differentiation according to credit risks: no penalisation for 
social banks 
Banks that implement investment policies shown under letters B and C in the previous Table 
1 do not gain anything by adopting internal rating systems for credit risk,
32 as most of them 
operate with customers in a retail portfolio (or Small and Medium Enterprises – SME). 
 
For them, the alternative methodology will be to measure the credit risk in a standardised 
manner,  supported  by
33  external  credit  assessment  institutions  recognised  as  eligible  for 
capital purposes by national supervisors.
34 
 
It  is  clear  that,  unless  the  supervisory  authorities  intervene,  credits  to  companies  will 
predominantly be weighted with a coefficient of no more than 100%,
35 that is the same it was 
                                                 
31 See Watson (1977). 
32 For definition and the use of the “internal rating based –IRB” approaches to credit risk, see Second Part, 
Chapter III, of the New Accord, June 2004. 
33 It has been argued that this criterion is never applicable in developing countries because there are no rating 
agencies at all; even if there were, it would take a long time for them to set up and to test an adequate rating 
model. If this ever happens, the rating agency marginal cost will be higher than the marginal interest margin on 
lending. See the comments on the Third Consultative Paper on the New  Basel Capital Accord (CP3) from 
Tanzania, Trinidad and Tobago, Zimbabwe, available for download from www.bis.org.  
34 However, it must be said that while internal rating systems are subject to the explicit approval of the bank’s 
supervisor, the rating methodology adopted by ratings agencies is undisclosed and legally protected. 
35 Ratings are requested (and paid for) by companies: those with a rating below BB- will prefer to have not any 
rating at all and be classified as “unrated”. However, claims on sovereigns or developing countries are  now 
penalized, as the possible risk weights are 0%, 20%, 50%, 100%, 150% (depending on credit assessment) while 
under the first Capital Accord most of them fell under 0% or 20%; never above 100%. Associated with this fact, 
there is the wider concern that the higher capital absorption for exposures to most developing countries would Social and alternative banking: project selection and monitoring after the New Basel Capital Accord 
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foreseen in the previous accord of 1988. Furthermore, retail clients and SMEs with no credit 
rating  benefit  very  much
36  by  the  New  Accord,  if  the  credit  satisfies  the  following  four 
criteria:
37 
1.  Orientation criterion: the exposure is to persons or to a small business;. 
2.  Product criterion: the exposure takes the form of revolving credits and lines of credit, 
personal term loans and leases, small business facilities and commitments. 
3.  Granularity criterion: the retail portfolio must be sufficiently diversified to reduce the 
risks in the portfolio as far as to justify a weighting of 75%. 
4.  Low  value  of  individual  exposures:  the  maximum  aggregated  retail  exposure  to  a 
single counterpart cannot exceed € 1 million. 
 
From this point of view too, the New Accord allows a reduction in capital absorption, even 
for banks that do not operate with  financial  aims. In  fact, beneficiaries of social  banking 
activities often  fall  into the retail or SME category,
38 and this will result  in a  lower risk 
weighting. If beneficiaries of social banking activities are corporate borrowers, adopting the 
standardized approach, capital absorption will be at maximum equal to that calculated under 
the previous version of 1988. 
 
Credit risk assessment based on internal ratings (IRB) is coherent with the financial objective 
of maximising the value of a firm. In fact, IRB is required in order to ensure the optimisation 
of  returns  on the  scarce  resource  (e.g. the  equity  capital)  or to transfer  its  marginal  cost 
downstream to the customers. A bank operating with non-financial aims has no interest in 
differentiating its customers on the basis of credit risk in order to apply differentiated pricing. 
Either the initiative is worthy of the credit, or it is not. The credit risk is not evaluated (and 
priced) on every single investment decision, but rather on the basis of an overall portfolio of 
credits (which acts as a financial constraint). This means the standard approach is preferable 
for these banks
39 and, therefore they have nothing to fear from the New Accord. 
                                                                                                                                                   
result in a reduction in capital flow, or in an increase in the credit spread. Both situations would impede, or 
further slow, the development of markets and economy in these regions. 
36 In terms of a weight of  75% on the bank exposure. 
37 See paragraph 70, New Accord . 
38 It has been argued that the company turnover threshold for defining SME borrowers, € 50 Mln (par. 273, New 
Accord), does not take into consideration the differences in the level of  economic development in different 
countries. The absolute threshold of € 1 million regarding the “Low value of individual exposure” criteria is also 
misleading, and an indexed version would be preferable. See comments received by Basel Committee on CP3 
from World Bank and Developing Countries on BIS web site. 
39 This statement is consistent with comments expressed by the European Association of Co-operative Banks 
(2003)   on the third consultative document “The New Basel Capital Accord” (CP3), Basel Committee (2003): Alberto Lanzavecchia – Lucia Poletti 
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A missed opportunity: the differentiation between traditional and social banks 
The  New  Accord  was  designed  for  and  is  applied  to  internationally  active  banks.
40  No 
distinctions are made between banks operating within a national boundary and international 
banks.  Moreover,  the  New  Accord  makes  no  distinctions  between  value-oriented  banks 
(shareholder view) and those with collective objectives (stakeholder view).  
 
The  distinction  between  value-oriented  and  social  banks  is  not  intended  to  remove  the 
depositors’ protection mechanism from the latter, but would recognise on one hand that these 
banks often operate on a strictly local basis (sometimes not even nationally), and on the other 




From the “operating area” distinctive point of view, the absence of international competition 
would  allow  social  banks  to  operate  with  lower  minimum  capital  requirements,  without 
damaging  or  distorting  the  international  competition  too  far.  Investor  protection  could  be 
guaranteed  through  the  constitution  of  a  special  consortium  guarantee  fund  (such  as  that 
offered by “Confidi regulation” in Italy), or through the insurance of the deposits.
42 
 
From the second distinctive point of view, seeing that for sustainable and social banking the 
credit risk acts more as a constraint to growth than as a driver to obtain proportional economic 
returns, an internal evaluation model should ideally differentiate activities on the basis of the 
credit worthiness. 
 
                                                                                                                                                   
“the standardized approach must remain a serious (and competitive) method for smaller banks and institutions”, 
p.2. 
40  We  remind  that  Basel  Committee  was  established  by  the  central-bank  Governors  of  the  G-10  countries. 
Evidences  of  the  G-10  environment.  Banks  active  on  developing  countries  face  a  very  different  economic 
environment (such as the absence of rating agencies; deep different thresholds that defines small businesses etc.) 
and risks (currency risk is higher).  
41 For example, Grameen Bank’s recovery rate of 90 per-cent (with 94 percent of its loans made to 
women) is higher than the rate recorded by the Bangladesh National Bank, which only recovers 25 percent of its 
loans  (ICDF,  2002).  In  fact,  according  to  van  Bastelaer  (1999),  when  the  lender  is  closely  related  to  the 
borrower,  the  role  of  interpersonal  ties  is  a  central  element  in  ensuring repayment.  If  there  is  no  a  priori 
relationship  between  the  borrower  and  the  lender,  social  factors  are  less  likely  to  be  central  elements  in 
explaining credit discipline, and 
their mobilization requires significantly more effort. Thus, a critical factor of success is the quality of the relation 
between the borrowers and the lender and the existence of trust between them. The capacity of microfinance 
organizations to instigate high levels of trust is one of their main characteristics, and it reflects their ability to 
draw on the diverse social elements of their environment in developing successful credit activity. Social and alternative banking: project selection and monitoring after the New Basel Capital Accord 
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A  collective  objectives  bank  would  have  as  a  trade  off  a  penalisation  or  an  incentive 
according to the level of the credit worthiness of the financed initiative. A credit portfolio 
with a high value in collective terms is worth more than one with a low value, assuming of 
course the full respect of the solvency and liquidity of the bank. 
 
Coherently with the financial objectives of the “traditional” banks (e.g. value creation and 
shareholders’ return), the New Accord has introduced an approach based on internal ratings: 
these  banks can  now  improve their return on capital using this option. The New  Accord 
favours value-oriented banks, but has not helped banks with collective objectives (of course, 
as we stated, that it has neither penalised them). 
 
However, it would have been possible for the New Accord to provide for the needs of social 
banks.  In  fact,  it  could  have  allowed  them  the  managerial  option  to  better  achieve  their 
objective, that of benefiting the community. For example, it would have been possible to 
differentiate  social  banks  introducing  a  two-stage  procedure  for  the  lending  process:  one 
economic-financial (credit risk) and the other social/environmental (credit worthiness). 
 
Commercial  banks  have  seen,  with  good  reasons,  their  own  need  to  optimise  the  scarce 
resource (equity capital) to reach their own satisfied objectives (shareholder’s returns). But 
social banks have not received equally favourable differential treatment for the achievement 
of their own objectives. 
 
                                                                                                                                                   
42 See Buser, Chen and Kane (1981). Alberto Lanzavecchia – Lucia Poletti 
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4. Conclusions 
 
Investment decisions are taken to achieve an objective: private benefits and/or collective benefits. 
In analysing banking investments, the decision makers need a formal framework to reach their 
decision to accept or refuse a loan. Such a framework has been used and formalised for a long 
time  to  analyse  financial  objectives,  but  investment  decisions  on  projects  with  collective 
objectives are a relatively recent phenomenon. 
 
The logical distinction between profit projects (financial objective-collective constraints) and non-
profit projects (collective objectives-financial constraints) is not always identifiable, rigorous and 
constant over time. Precisely for this reason, there is a need of an analysis methodology that 
combines financial and collective logics. From the point of view of the banks, this translates into 
assessment processes that are not based only on the expected returns, but also on the collective 
effects generated by the project or by the borrower. 
 
The  recent  New  Accord  on  minimum  capital  requirements  was  designed  for  financial 
intermediaries from G-10 countries, more sensitive to shareholder’s wealth. The New Accord 
outlines a framework that could further strengthen the soundness and stability of the international 
banking system, and, at the same time, achieve a collective object: the protection of depositors. 
 
The revised framework does not penalise microcredit and loans to private and small and medium 
businesses, and in some circumstances it favours them. However, it has principally met the needs 
of  those  banks  managed  for  maximizing  the  shareholders’  wealth  or  the  return  on  capital 
employed. In fact, facing important investments in credit risk assessment systems, these banks can 
now  benefit  from  a  reduction  in  capital  absorption  or  can  transfer  the  marginal  cost  of  the 
absorbed capital downstream to their customers. 
 
As they do not have the objective of optimising the return on the scarce resources (equity capital), 
social banks, or those with collective objects, do not find this innovation advantageous at all, and 
will probably continue to work with the previous method - the standardised approach. In this 
sense,  the  New  Accord  represents  a  missed  opportunity  to  recognise  and  handle  the  huge 
differences within the banking sector: the economic environment, geographic boundaries and firm 
objectives. Commercial banks from developed countries have benefited from it, while others, and 
in particular social banks, have not. Social and alternative banking: project selection and monitoring after the New Basel Capital Accord 
- 25 - 
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